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Presentations


Presentation Download Conferences Date
Hacking an altcoin node for ̶f̶u̶n̶ ̶a̶n̶d̶ profit N/A WarCon III June 2018
I Got 99 Trends and a # is All of Them! How We Found Over 100 RCE Vulnerabilities in Trend Micro Software pdf slideshare Hack In The Box 2017 Amsterdam April 2017
Augmented Reality in your web proxy slideshare HackPra Allstars - OWASP App Sec EU 2013 (Hamburg) August 2013
Cross Context Scripting attacks and exploitation slideshare HackPra (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) November 2012
Window Shopping: Browser Bug Hunting in 2012 pdf . slideshare Hack In the Box 2012 (Amsterdam) May 2012
Bridging The Gap: Security and software testing pdf . slideshare ANZTB Test Conference 2011 (Auckland) Mar 2010
Defending Against Application Level DoS Attacks pdf . slideshare OWASP New Zealand Day 2010 (Auckland) Jul 2010
Exploiting Firefox Extensions pdf . slideshare . video OWASP AppSec Asia & SecurityByte 2009 (Gurgaon, IN)

DEFCON 17 (Las Vegas, US)

EUSecWest 2009 (London, UK)
Nov 2009
Reversing JavaScript zip . slideshare OWASP New Zealand Chapter Mar 2009
None More Black: The Dark Side of SEO pdf . slideshare Ruxcon 2008 (Sydney, AU)

Kiwicon II (Wellington, NZ)
Oct 2008
Browser Security ppt . slideshare OWASP New Zealand Chapter Sep 2008
Black Energy 1.8 - Russian botnet package analysis ppt . slideshare Hack In The Bush (Internal Training) May 2008
Web Spam Techniques ppt . slideshare OWASP New Zealand Chapter Apr 2008
XPath Injection ppt . slideshare OWASP New Zealand Chapter Feb 2008
Ajax Security ppt . slideshare OWASP New Zealand Chapter Dec 2007

Popular posts from this blog

TrendMicro ScanMail for Microsoft Exchange (SMEX) predictable session token - CVE-2015-3326

It's time for another advisory ( CVE-2015-3326 ), a simple one, for a vulnerability which can be found quickly and trivially. For those of you who just want to give a glance at the post, I suggest to directly watch the picture which says it all! The following vulnerability was discovered on TrendMicro SMEX (ScanMail for Microsoft Exchange) 10 SP2 but it affects other versions as well. While surfing the SMEX web administrative interface using a web proxy, I have noticed something in the HTTP request - the session token itself and its format, a number. After observing a significant number of logins, the session token was always represented with an number composed of minimum 4 digits and maximum 5 digits, as shown in the screen shot below:   Although the observed session tokens were never generated sequentially, the lack of a cryptographically strong PRNG for the session identifier, allows a malicious user to trivially guess the token. This attack can be easily automated.

Alcatel Lucent Omnivista or: How I learned GIOP and gained Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2016-9796)

It is time for another advisory or better a blog post about Alcatel Lucent Omnivista  and its vulnerabilities. Omnivista is a central management network tool and it is typically used in medium/large organisation with a complex VoIP/SIP infrastructure. Interestingly enough, this software belongs to the niche of "undownloadable" software and it requires a license to work as well. My "luck" came during an engagement where it was already installed and this post documents one of the many 0days discovered during such audit. The reasons why I wanted to dedicate a single blog post on this vulnerability are several. First, remote code execution (RCE) is always a sweet bug to show. Second, I strongly believe that documenting vulnerabilities in applications using old protocols and standards, respectively GIOP and CORBA, can be beneficial for the infosec community, since no many examples of vulnerabilities in such applications are available or published on the Interne

Microsoft .NET MVC ReDoS (Denial of Service) Vulnerability - CVE-2015-2526 (MS15-101)

Microsoft released a security bulletin ( MS15-101 ) describing a .NET MVC Denial of Service vulnerability ( CVE-2015-2526 ) that I reported back in April. This blog post analyses the vulnerability in details, starting from the theory and then providing a PoC exploit against a MVC web application developed with Visual Studio 2013. For those of you who want to see the bug, you can directly skip to the last part of this post or watch the video directly... ;-) A bit of theory The .NET framework (4.5 tested version) uses backtracking regular expression matcher when performing a match against an expression. Backtracking is based on the NFA (non-deterministic finite automata) algorithm engine which is designed to validate all input states. By providing an “evil” regex expression – an expression for which the engine can be forced to calculate an exponential number of states - it is possible to force the engine to calculate an exponential number of states, leading to a condition defined su