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Showing posts from 2016

Alcatel Lucent Omnivista or: How I learned GIOP and gained Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2016-9796)

It is time for another advisory or better a blog post about Alcatel Lucent Omnivista  and its vulnerabilities. Omnivista is a central management network tool and it is typically used in medium/large organisation with a complex VoIP/SIP infrastructure. Interestingly enough, this software belongs to the niche of "undownloadable" software and it requires a license to work as well. My "luck" came during an engagement where it was already installed and this post documents one of the many 0days discovered during such audit. The reasons why I wanted to dedicate a single blog post on this vulnerability are several. First, remote code execution (RCE) is always a sweet bug to show. Second, I strongly believe that documenting vulnerabilities in applications using old protocols and standards, respectively GIOP and CORBA, can be beneficial for the infosec community, since no many examples of vulnerabilities in such applications are available or published on the Interne...

Pwning a thin client in less than one minute, again!

Back in 2015, I have published a blog post titled " Pwning a thin client in less two minutes " which attracted a lot of curiosity from the Internet and which was also featured in the  HACKADAY  blog. Today, together with Vincent Hutsebaut ( @vhutsebaut ), we are releasing a further technique to pwn the same thin client and get a root shell without authentication, in less than one minute! The attack detailed below is a typical kiosk attack which consists in a local privilege escalation which affects different versions of HP Thin Pro OS (HP ThinPro 4.4, HP ThinPro 5.0, HP ThinPro 5.1, HP ThinPro 5.2, HP ThinPro 5.2.1, HP ThinPro 6.0, HP ThinPro 6.1). The vulnerability (CVE-2016-2246) has been patched by HP and a technical bulletin has been published . HP stated that they have fixed the issue before our report was sent to them and were on the way to publish a security bulletin when we contacted them. Since the patch is out, let's dive into the vulnerability, which i...

Microsoft Windows PDF Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2016-3374 (MS16-115)

In the last year, as a personal research project, I started to look more into browsers and decided to fuzz some high-level targets, such as Edge and IE11, together with Steven Seeley ( @steventseeley ). I have to admit that it is quite hard nowadays to approach this kind of research, especially with limited time and resources (just few virtual machines running at home…), but nevertheless it became an incredible learning experience. Given our constraints, the fuzzing focus was to target other things than common targeted components, such as DOM, JavaScript and so on, so we decided to go for the PDF file format. One of the interesting conditions that we found was the one that has just been patched by Microsoft and detailed in the MS16-115  security bulletin. The vulnerability is an out-of-bounds read which can lead to memory information disclosure. The technical advisory can be found at Steven Seeley's web site:  http://srcincite.io/advisories/src-2016-0039/ . Refer...

TrendMicro ScanMail for Microsoft Exchange (SMEX) predictable session token - CVE-2015-3326

It's time for another advisory ( CVE-2015-3326 ), a simple one, for a vulnerability which can be found quickly and trivially. For those of you who just want to give a glance at the post, I suggest to directly watch the picture which says it all! The following vulnerability was discovered on TrendMicro SMEX (ScanMail for Microsoft Exchange) 10 SP2 but it affects other versions as well. While surfing the SMEX web administrative interface using a web proxy, I have noticed something in the HTTP request - the session token itself and its format, a number. After observing a significant number of logins, the session token was always represented with an number composed of minimum 4 digits and maximum 5 digits, as shown in the screen shot below:   Although the observed session tokens were never generated sequentially, the lack of a cryptographically strong PRNG for the session identifier, allows a malicious user to trivially guess the token. This attack can be easily ...