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It is time for another advisory or better a blog post about Alcatel Lucent Omnivista  and its vulnerabilities. Omnivista is a central management network tool and it is typically used in medium/large organisation with a complex VoIP/SIP infrastructure. Interestingly enough, this software belongs to the niche of "undownloadable" software and it requires a license to work as well. My "luck" came during an engagement where it was already installed and this post documents one of the many 0days discovered during such audit. The reasons why I wanted to dedicate a single blog post on this vulnerability are several. First, remote code execution (RCE) is always a sweet bug to show. Second, I strongly believe that documenting vulnerabilities in applications using old protocols and standards, respectively GIOP and CORBA, can be beneficial for the infosec community, since no many examples of vulnerabilities in such applications are available or published on the Interne

Kemp virtual load master is a virtual load-balancer appliance which comes with a web administrative interface. I had a chance to test it and this blog post summarises some of the most interesting vulnerabilities I have discovered and which have not been published yet. For those of you who want to try it as well, you can get a free trial version here:  http://kemptechnologies.com/server-load-balancing-appliances/virtual-loadbalancer/vlm-download By default, Kemp web administrative interface is protected by Basic authentication, so the vulnerabilities discussed in the post below can either be exploited attacking an authenticated user via CSRF or XSS based attacks. The following vulnerabilities were discovered when looking at Kemp Load Master v.7.1-16 and some of them should be fixed in the latest version (7.1-20b or later). Change logs of the fixed issues can be found at the following page: " PD-2183 Functions have been added to sanitize input in the WUI in order to   reso